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GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF TRANSPORTATION
CHARGES.-PART I.

i. Introduction, Historicaland General.
The American democracy is self-distrustful. It was in the
beginning, and continues increasingly so, The only department of the government in which conservative citizens seem
to have enduring confidence, the judicial, is the least democratic, the least in contact with the popular will. Our written
constitutions gave to the courts at the start the control and
definition of the legislative power. Nowadays, more and
more, the judiciary are looked to for the exercise of that
control, for the restriction to the utmost of the legislative
assemblies, whose acts are anticipated chiefly with dread.
This American idiosyncracy, of throwing upon the courts
so large a measure of responsibility for the conduct of things
in general, gives to those bodies an appalling amount of work,
especially in the department of law with which this paper
deals. In case of those enterprises considered to be of a
public nature, and so subject to regulation by the legislative
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power, the courts find it necessary to make minute business
investigations to find whether the legislature has infringed
some constitutional right, and at times there are curious
results. For example, United States District Judge Seaman,
in the Milwaukee Street-car Case, according to press accounts,
has decided, as a matter of law, that the four-cent fares required
by governmental action will of necessity reduce the income of
the Milwaukee company so as to amount to the taking of
property without due process. At the same time the financial
statements of companies in Detroit and Toronto, cities similar
to Milwaukee in area and population, show large profits on
considerably smaller fares.1 The same law or ordinance might
then be constitutional for Detroit and unconstitutional for
Milwaukee.
The United States Supreme Court has already given us, in
the Nebraska Freight Rate Case,2 a decision under which a
law may be unconstitutional this year, but constitutional next
year, by operation only of changing economic conditions
brought about by lapse of time. This decision, under the
conditions prevailing at the time the case went to court,
would almost certainly render unconstitutional any law whatever regulating railroad charges, in thirty-eight states of the
Union, including every state likely to pass such a law 3
In view of cases like these a grave doubt arises whether
such legislative regulation of charges is a practicable thing.
Back of this is the further question, always mooted but never
decided, whether interference with contracts of individuals or
corporations really belongs among the powers of government.
To take the more natural order, the inquiries to be made in
this discussion are two: (I) Has a government the right to
dictate the terms of the contracts of its subjects ? And (2), if
so, can it practicably enforce its dictation ?
In this introductory part, a short view of the laissez faire
doctrine, with a sketch of early government price regulation,
The Outlook for June I8, 1898.
2Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418 (T898).
1
3

See article by Mr. H. P. Robinson, Editor of the Railway Age, in the

North American Review for April, 1898.
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in general, will lead up to the first of the before mentioned
inquiries, and will prepare the way for a narrowing of the
question to transportation charges.
The advocates of laissezfaire presented their policy as preeminently a policy for the future. As time goes by, they
said, the supposed need for governmental interference will disappear. People will become more self-reliant, and will learn
to do by private enterprise the things which now wait on
government initiative. John Stuart Mill found the only possible justification for a tariff in the establishment of "infant
industries" in new countries. Herbert Spencer excused past
extension of governing functions by the imperfect civilization
of those times : "In the primitive man, and in man but little
civilized, there does not exist the nature required for extensive
voluntary co-operations. Efforts willingly united with those of
others for a common advantage imply, if the undertaking is
large, a perseverance he does not possess. Moreover, where
the benefits to be achieved are distant and unfamiliar, as are
many for which men nowadays combine, there needs a
strength of constructive imagination not to be found in the
minds of the uncivilized. The implication is that, during
long stages of social evolution, there needs, for the management of all matters but the simplest, a governmental power
great in degree and wide in range, with a correlative faith in it
and obedience to it. And hence the fact that, only little by
little, can voluntary co-operation replace compulsory co-operation and rightly bring about a correlative decrease of faith in
governmental ability." '
Presumably, Mr. Spencer here refers to the construction of
pyramids, canals, temples, etc., by ancient nations, acting
through their governments. The inference that might be
drawn, however; that voluntary associations were not numerous or powerful in the early civilizations, seems subject to a
little modification.
Voluntary commercial associations or
guilds are known to be of great antiquity. The first city governments are supposed to have been their outcome; for exISocial Statics.

Abridged and revised by Herbert Spencer. Apple-

ton's Edition of 1892, pP. 414 and 415.
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ample, those of the Hanseatic League certainly were. The
Branoi in Greece, the Collegia of Rome, the Arli Mffajori of
Florence, the Twelve Great Companies of London, are all
evidences that private action, even in antiquity and in the
Middle Ages, though rare and impotent compared with
modern enterprise, was far more common than that of the
government. The charters which the companies obtained
were, in the first instance, merely confirmations of customs
they had already exercised of their own accord; but later, in
the increasing importance of the Crown, they were regarded
as special grants of the King, and so subject completely to his
control. Accordingly, the London Company, the Plymouth
Company, the East India Company and all the English colonial
corporations enjoyed their powers directly under the Crown,
were considered as exercising the royal prerogative, and
seemed to be merely the agents of the government. The
King could do as he liked with his creatures, and, consequently, few disputes as to the powers of corporations came
into the courts.'
So corporation law, as we know it to-day, is almost wholly
a modern product-not because there were no voluntary associations at the beginning of the common law, but because
they speedily came to be either themselves political corporations, as in the case of the towns, or the servants and creatures of political corporations, as in the case of the great
colonial trading companies. It is safe to say that many times
more voluntary combinations have been organized in the half
century since Spencer's Social Statistics was first published,
than in all time before. Has the result been that anticipated
by the learned philosopher? Have governments more and
more withdrawn themselves from interference with industry
I Religious corporations are hereleft out of account. The zeal for Mother
Church furnished the "perseverance" and "imagination" required for
such bodies by Mr. Spencer. Their unrestrained energies, resulting in the
ownership by them at one time of over one-third of the land of England,
and in the consequent mortmain laws and confiscation of the monasteries, furnished a striking instance of the principal characteristic of a
corporation-perpetual succession-and of how the momentum of power
inevitably drew to it the attention and interference of the state.
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and with contracts, as men in their private capacity have
shown themselves able to accomplish greater and greater results ? Or have the power and energy of these combinations
produced the very opposite effect to that expected by the
laissez faire philosophers ?
Judge Caldwell, dissenting, in Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Com.pany,1 declares ironically: "What. each, fildivffdiua member of
a labor organization may lawfully do, acting singly, becomes
an unlawful conspiracy when done by them collectively.
Singly they may boycott; collectively they cannot. The individual boycott is lawful, because it can accomplish little or
nothing; the collective boycott is unlawful, because it might
accomplish something."
This statement contains, perhaps, more truth than was intended by the learned judge. The tremendous power exerted
by associations is exactly what makes them dangerous and to
be feared, exactly what gives the public an "interest" in them
and draws to them the attention of the law. And this is true
not merely with reference to labor organizations.
Herbert Spencer (I quote continually from him as the ablest
representative of his school) said, in I85O, after running over
many possible opportunities for government interference, "the

hours of labour too-what must be done about these?
Having acceded to the petition of the factory workers, ought
we not to entertain that of the journeymen bakers ? And if
that of the journeymen bakers, why not, as Mr. Cobden asks,
consider the cases of the glassblowers, the night men, the
iron founders, the Sheffield knife grinders, and, indeed, all
other classes, including the hardworked M. P.'s themselves ?
And when employment has been provided and the hours of
labour fixed, and trade regulations settled, we must decide
how far the state ought to look after peoples' minds and
morals and health. There is this education question : having
satisfied the prevalent wish for government schools with taxpaid teachers, and adopted Mr. Ewart's plan for town libraries
and museums, should we not canvass the supplementary
1 83 Fed. 912, 931 (1897).
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proposition to have national lecturers? And if this proposal
is assented to, would it not be well to carry out the scheme of
Sir David Brewster, who desired to have men'ordained by the
state to the undivided functions of science '----'
an intellectual
priesthood'-' to develop the glorious truths which time and
space embosom?' "1 And so on in the same strain. It is
interesting to observe that almost all of these satiric questions.
have since been answered in the affirmative, or at least are
favorably considered, even to that concerning the scientific
men, who would be developed and supported by the proposed
National University at Washington. It is interesting, too, to
note that the " police function," which alone Spencer and his
school asserted to be that of the state, and by which they
meant the barest "protection" of individual members of
society against aggression, has come in the United States to
cover almost any action desired by the " expediency philosopher." The " police power" apparently now affords an
excuse for any legislation considered by legislatures
and courts to be for the public advantage, intellectually,
morally, physically, or economically. " Between the one
extreme of entire non-interference and the other extreme in
which every citizen is to be transformed into a grown-up
baby, there lie innumerable stopping places; and he who
would have the state do more than protect, is required to say
where he means to draw the line, and to give us reasons why
it must be just there and nowhere else ? "12
This demand on its face seems reasonable and to inquire
whether such a line can be drawn is one purpose of the present
discussion.
Mr. ArThur T. Hadley, in an article on " Legal Theories of
Price Regulation,"

3

remarks: "The common law . . . recog-

nized the public commercial end, which the Roman law did
not."
Mr. Hadley's language might lead to the inference that the
Common Law, the law of England, as distinguished from that
ISocial Statics. 1892 Ed. of Appleton, pp. 129, 130.
2

Social Statics, p. 13r.
3I Yale Review, 56, May, 1892.
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,of the continent, was especially careful of the interests of trade
and regarded high prices as contrary to public policy, because
discouraging to a healthy commerce.
Mr. James Parsons seems to adopt a very different view.
Feudal ideas revolving about the central notion of landed
property dominated the early common law. Man was considered a mere locum tenens, and land the chief person, so to
speak. 1 The laws of commerce were exotic, being introduced into the English law, under the name of the Law
Merchant, from the civil law. The Law Merchant brought
in the conception of Partnership, whereupon "a new form was
required to express the new undertaking and embody the
partner's contract. But the courts preferred to take what they
had at hand.'
"They took the old formula, made it answer for the occa-sion without introducing any variation, without adapting it to
the new subject matter. The joint obligation was the uncouth form, which was turned to account and held to express
the firm contract. This kind of obligation never did correspond to any business transaction, and, in place of it, the con-tinental countries, whzich were foremost in trade (italics mine),
have, from the earliest times, recognized a commercial contract. The commercial contract has at last become, with us,
the real exponent of the partner's status." 3 And again he
says: " Look at the common law, and see how it frustrates at
every turn the design of the partners."'
As this design was
trade, it is easy to see what Mr. Parsons thinks of the care
for commerce supposed to have been exercised by the old
-common law.
The commercial greatness of the Anglo-Saxon in nations,
1 Principles of Partnership, p. 8, "elpassim.
2 This preference of the courts for "what they have on hand" ap-

pears strikingly in later phases of commercial law, e. g., that of corporations. See "Law Relating to Corporate Liability for Acts of Promoters," 36 Am. LAw RiG. & Rlv. (N. S.) 545, by Malcolm Lloyd,
Jr., for the struggle of the courts to apply their ready-made doctrines of
ratification and "recovery for benefits conferred" to corporations.
3 Principles of Partnership, p. 239.
4 Page 242.
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Mr. Parsons points out, has been in spite of the early jealousy
of the common law, just as the immense counting-house
transactions of the English have been accomplished, notwithstanding their bungling systems of weights and measures.
It may well be doubted, then, whether the feudal lords who
ruled the common law had any very great love for trade as
such. That occupation was mostly carried on by ex-villeins
and their descendants who had bought charters of exemption
from ordinary feudal services, and thus escaped the menial ta,,ks
their base birth would otherwise have compelled them to.
Trading was considered but a shade lower than the labors of
pure villeinage and became a matter of interest to the lord only
when it directly attacked his pocket. As the common law at
first dealt with the partnership not to encourage the trader,
but simply for the protection of his creditor, so it treated the
merchant as a mere convenience to his lordly customer. It is
interesting to observe that the first statutes giving expression
to this feeling of the common law, were enacted just after the
Black Death, when the villeins generally were giving their
masters great annoyance. The laws regulating prices seem to
have been a part of the Statutes of Labourers, a part of the
same endeavor to control a troublesome set of serfs, who, to
the lords' astonishment, took the opportunity given them by
the Black Death to manifest a little independence. " Quia
magna pars populi et maxime operariorum et servientium
nuper in pestilentia moriebatur," sadly runs the old Statute,
"nonnulli, videntes necessitatem dominorum et paucitatem
servientium, serzire noluerunt, nisi salariareciperent excessiva,
et alii mendicare, malentes in otio quam per laborem pcrquirere
victum suum "-" have refused to serve unless they receive
excessive wages, and some preferring to beg at leisure
rather than by labor to get their living," it was ordained
(Cap. I.) that " Every person able in body under the age of
sixty years, not having to live on, being required, shall be
bound to serve him that doth require him, or else committed
to the gaol, until he find surety to serve; " (Cap. II.) " If a
workman or servant depart from service before the time agreed
upon, he shall be imprisoned; " (Cap. III.) "The old wages
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and no more shall be given to servants." And in Cap. IV_
it is said "Item quod carnifices . . . et omnes alii venditores
victualium quorumcunque teneanter hujusmodi victualia ven. ita quod habeant hujusmodi
dere propretio rationabili .
venditores moderatum ltucrum et non excessivuhm, etc.-" that
butchers . . . and all other sellers of all victuals whatsoever
shall be bound to sell the same victuals for a reasonable price
. . so that they may have a msoderategain and not excessive.'
The Act of 37 Edw. III. cap. V.2 provided against ingrossing "merchandise to inhance the price of them,", ' for the
great mischiefs, which have happened . . . of that the merchants, called grocers, do ingross all manner of merchandise
vendible; and suddenly do enhance the price of such merchandise within the realm, putting to sale by covin and
ordinance made betwixt them, called the fraternity and guild of
merchants." . . .
It is impossible to read these statutes without coming to the
conclusion that regulation of prices was not for the purpose of
fostering commerce, any more than the restriction of apparel
or the fixing of wages which went in the same act. These
regulations were all a part of the attempt of the governing
landed aristocracy to prescribe to the lower classes the
conduct of their lives. It follows, that little argument from
those "antique rudimentary times," from those conditions
existing in the breaking up of the feudal system, can be used
1

See 2 Gen. Stats., p. 162.

2

Statute of Laborers, 29 Edw. III. A. D. 1349, 2 Stats. at Large, pp..

26-28. This act and many others of a similar nature passed later were
repealed by 5 Eliz. c. 4, A. D. 1562. The Statute of Eliz. did not fix an
arbitrary rate of wages, but provided for a commission in each shire
(like some of our railway commissions), the members of which "conferring together, respecting the plenty or scarcity of the time and other
circumstances necessarily to be considered" should "limit, rate, and
appoint the wages." The commissions were to be composedofthe justices.
of the peace. See 6 Gen. Stats., p. i64. Artificers were compellable to
work in hay-time and harvest. Anyonegiving more wages than assessed
by the justices was to be imprisoned ten days without bail and fined five
pounds, and any one taking such excessive wages was to suffer imprisonment for twenty-one days. The act was repealed 1875, 38 & 39 Vic. ch.
86, sec. 17.
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either for or against legislative action at the present day. The
attempt has been made on both sides, however. On the
part of governmental control it has been said that "the
common law ' theory (was) that the price of a commodity is a
public matter," being "based on the assumption that the
public as a whole has an interest in price, . . . in the price
of everything sold in the markets of the nation." 2 From this
we are led to infer that price regulation has nothing in it
opposed to Anglo-Saxon traditions and that it should be easy
to adopt a policy which appealed so strongly to our fathers.
On the other hand, Mr. Albert Stickney,3 after reproducing
most of the English statutes, says: "These statutes are quoted
at some length, for two purposes; the one is, to show how
thorough and complete was the experience already had under
the English law prior to our separation from the mother
country, in attempts to control trade and commerce and
especially prices, by statute; the other is, to show the magnitude and intricacy of the undertaking which lies before
legislators of the present day if they enter on that line of
legislation. Utterly hopeless, and utterly fruitless, in anything
save annoyance, all such legislation always has been, and so
far as we can form ajudgment in the light of history, always
will be.
" It will appear, too, that the latest attempts in this country
to control the so-called 'trusts' and 'monopolies' of to-day
are on the same line with these statutes set forth."
It is rather difficult to form a "judgment in the light of
history " when the present conditions are so different
It is hard to argue from the
from those of "history."
failure of a small governing class to regulate every detail
of the daily lives of their inferiors, at a time when
combinations were rare and inefficient, when society was
1It is to be supposed that the learned author means the general consensus of feeling in the common law time, expressed both by decision
and by statute.
2
Mr. Win. Draper Lewis in 32 Am. LAw RiG. & Riv. (N. S.), p. io.
See,
also, 36 AM. LAW REG. & REV. (N. S.), p. 8.
3
State Control of Commerce and Trade, p. 37, 1897.
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scarcely organized industrially, and what Professor Cairnes
calls "non-competing industrial groups" had not yet been
developed by modern machinery. It may be noted, too,
that Mr. Stickney lays small stress on those statutes about
the success or failure of which there is dispute-for example,
the shipping and navigation laws, which came after the turbulent times of feudalism.'
IThis "navigation" legislation, which was just as much "interfer-ence" as the actual setting of prices, is nowadays considered by all, except
the few remaining adherents of the Manchester school, to have been
largely the cause of England's colonial greatness. The policy is still in
part adhered to by Great Britain in her subsidies to steamship lines, in
her gigantic naval operations and her Chamberlain colonial administration. If England had been ruled by philosophers like Mr. Spencer, it is
doubtful whether she would ever have had dominion beyond her own
borders. Mr. Spencer is never so sarcastic as when describing the conquest of a colony inhabited by natives whose natural rights to live in
savagery, if they so choose, are being violated.
Mr. Stickney (State Control of Commerce and Trade, p. 98) also adduces, as examples of the futility of legislative attempts to interfere in
private affairs, the statutes passed in New England and New York just
after the Revolutionary War, designed to control the prices of commodities in the Continental currency. For example, the Massachusetts statute
of 1777, "An Act to Prevent Monopoly and Oppression," declared "that
the prices of all the articles produced in America hereinbefore enumerated . . . shall be taken and deemed to be the prices of such goods
and articles in the town of Boston; and that the selectmen and the committees of the several towns in this state shall be and hereby are impowered to affix and settle in their respective towns what such articles and
goods shall be sold for in their towns, respectively, according to the proportion the price such goods have borne in such towns with the price
they have been at in the town of Boston, according to the ancient usage
and custom of such towns." The act also provided that persons having
necessaries for the army and navy, and refusing to sell them, thereby
subjected their stores to be opened by warrant; and also that if any
person had more of any article "than is necessary for the consumption
of his own family and immediate dependents, and which he holds with
an apparent design, in the judgment of the major part of the selectmen
of the town where he lives or where such articles shall be, to sell, trade
upon, and not for his own consumption as aforesaid, and shall refuse to
sell and dispcse of the same for the common currency of this state, or
the United States of America, and at the prices affixed and settled by
this act, or by the selectmen and committee in pursuance of it," a warrant should issue, at application of any needy person, "to open any
store, warehouse or granary in which such article or articles may be,"
and the commodities thus obtained should be sold by the selectmen to
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Per contra, neither can the attempt of a feudal oligarchy to
enact sumptuary legislation be used as a precedent for a modem
democracy.
We may admit that "legislation in England, after the mediroval days, gradually ceased to regulate the cropping of the
fields, or dictate the ratio of cattle to acreage, or specify
modes of manufacture and materials to be used, or fix wages
and prices, or interfere with dresses and games (except where
there was gambling), or put bounties and penalties on imports
or exports, or prescribe men's beliefs, religious or political, or
prevent them from combining as they pleased, or travelling
where they liked. That is to say, throughout a large range
of conduct, the right of the citizen to uncontrolled action has
been made good against the pretensions of the state to control
him." 1 We may admit all this, and yet refuse to acknowledge
its application to circumstances essentially new. To do that
would be to attempt "to derive permanent principles from
transient phenomena."'
The reasons or justifications usually given for legislative or
judicial intervention fall under three general heads.
(I.) The parties to the contract may be considered of a
peculiarly public character, either: (a.) Because they are
artificial persons created by the state; or (b.) Because, being
natural persons, they have received from the state certain
favors, as bounties or monopolies.
"such necessitous person, so much . . . as he stands in need of ... at
the price affixed as aforesaid."
Mr. Stickney argues, from the failure of these and like endeavors to
legislate out of existence the evils of an inflated currency, the necessary
failure of all efforts, under all circumstances, to control by legislation
what Mr. Stickney calls "private employments."
The legal tender acts, passed at the same time as the others and for the
same purpose, were also a dead letter. Mr. Stickney, writing before 1861,
might have gone on to prove that, according to all experience, any legal
tender act must have been a complete failure. There is little use in attempting to generalize from the exceptional examples afforded by times
-ofwar and economic distress.
' Herbert Spencer, " Man v. The State," p. 396.
2John B. Clark, "The Limits of Competition," II. Pol. S. Q., p. 45,
z887.
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(2.) The subject matter of the contract may be asserted to
be of an intrinsically public nature and so under public
control. For example: (a.) In a sale the commodity sold
may belong to the people at large; or (b.) In a contract of
service, the thing to be done, the service, may.be stamped
with a peculiarly public character. The reasons under these
heads alone have even the appearance of clear definition.
Those under the third may be expressed in the all-comprehensive words "public policy" ' or more at length :
(3.) The effect of the contract on the public interests,
hygienically, morally or economically. Of course, the admission of so broad a reason practically means giving the legislatures a free hand, and the advocates of freedom of contract
have been most earnest to deny'the existence of the third rule.
They have opposed the extensions of the "police power"
as the champions of personal liberty. Says one of them,
"Well did the great Hungarian orator say that God has
bestowed two supreme boons on man-celestial bliss hereafter
and liberty on earth. Under the delusive pretence of helping
us to the first, the fanatical votaries of interference would deprive us of the second." 2
Having thus left ourselves in a measure free from at least
the earliest and crudest part of "that codeless myriad of precedent, that wilderness of single instances," 3 the common
law, and from feudal legislation of the same period, either its

IItis strange that there should still be ambiguity in these terms.
Mr. C. C. Bonney. of Chicago, as long ago as 1864, gave the following
clear and conclusive definition : "Public policy is a universal rule of law,
for the promotion of the right and the suppression of the wrong. It
embraces in one complex rule, the conclusions of the common sense oJ
mankind. It enters into every law and every contract, and exercises a
controlling influence in their interpretation and application:" Bonney
on Railway Carriers, p. 34.
Mr. Frederick N. Judson, of St. Louis (Address Am. Bar Assoc. 1891,
25 Am. L. Rev. 889), says: "It has been defined as the prevailing opinion
as [to] what is for the public good. The public policy of one generation
is not that of another." These attempts at definition are rather comprehensive than precise, but, perhaps, are as " definitive" as the nature of
the case will allow.
2 The Interference Theory of Government. By Chas. A. Bristed, 1867.
3 Tennyson, Aylmer's Field.
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original enactment or its subsequent repeal, we shall be
ready to examine the reasons for and against government
regulation and restriction of the right to contract.
It is not proposed to discuss here that portion of the "police
power," now h synonym for general legislative authority, which
guards the public health and morals. For purposes of this
discussion only the economic side will be regarded. The
grounds usually given may then be diagrammed as follows:
I. Public Character of Parties.
a. Artificial Persons.
b. Natural PersonsUnder Special Governmental Favor
2. Public Subject Matter of Contract.
a. Sale of Public Commodity.
b. Contract of Public Service.
3. Public Effect of Contract, in
a. Creation of Monopoly or
b. Injury of Trade (including "oppression of third persons ") or
c. Rise of Prices.
Roy Wilson White.
(To be continued.)

